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Abstract 
 
The 1991 Credit Lyonnais court ruling expanded the fiduciary duties of managers 
towards debtholders in near-insolvent Delaware firms. Differences-in-differences tests reveal 
that innovation efficiency increased among all Delaware firms following the ruling. Further, 
Delaware firms close to (far from) insolvency reduced (expanded) their R&D expenditures and 
innovation output. Both sets of firms exhibit a reduced focus on meeting myopic earnings goals, 
and a shift from transient towards dedicated institutional owners. We conclude that expanding 
fiduciary duties towards debtholders motivated a longer-term focus at Delaware firms and, as 
evidenced by improvements in Tobin’s Q and solvency, benefited both shareholders and 
debtholders.  
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1. Introduction 
Agency issues between shareholders and debtholders have long been hypothesized to 
influence managerial actions and strategic focus.1 A critical issue with empirical research in this 
field has been the intrinsic endogeneity of managerial decisions, the nature of the firm and 
agency issues. This makes it difficult to attribute observed managerial actions and firm-level 
decisions to the influence of agency issues (Zingales 1998). In this paper, we examine the agency 
environment’s influence on a firm’s pursuit of long-term versus short-term goals in a setting that 
mitigates endogeneity concerns.  
The 1991 court ruling on Credit Lyonnais v Pathe Communications provides an 
important exogenous shock to the agency environment of all firms incorporated in Delaware 
(hereafter, Delaware firms). Until this event, US courts in practice largely conformed to the 
premise that managers owed fiduciary duties primarily to the firm and its owners but not its 
creditors, unless firms were already in bankruptcy. In a path-breaking departure, the Delaware 
Chancery court asserted in 1991 that when a firm is near insolvency, the board of directors and 
managers bear fiduciary duties towards both shareholders and debtholders.  
By requiring that managers and directors not act in the sole interest of shareholders when 
the latter may be at risk of losing control of the firm, the Delaware court ruling shifted the 
balance of power away from shareholders. In the context of this ruling, we examine the 
following question: how did the altered agency environment influence the risk-return trade-offs 
in Delaware firms’ investment decisions, particularly those that require a longer-term-focus?  
Shareholders and debtholders of near-insolvent firms are likely to have different appetites 
for risk. For example, in light of impending and probable bankruptcy, debtholders naturally 
1 The literature on shareholder-debtholder agency issues is extensive, including  among others Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Myers (1977), Jensen (1986), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990), Smith and Watts (1992), and Parrino 
and Weisbach (1999). See Smith (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1991) for partial reviews.  
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prefer that any new projects taken on by their borrowers emphasize lower volatility. In contrast, 
shareholders may prefer high-risk projects that transfer wealth from debtholders (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Warga and Welch 1993, Parrino and Weisbach 1999, Eisdorfer 2008). The 
Delaware ruling altered the agency dynamic by restricting shareholders’ abiltity to demand that 
managers pursue such projects. Interestingly, even though the ruling thus clearly favored 
debtholders, Becker and Stromberg (2012) provide evidence that Delaware firms on average 
experienced positive equity returns upon the 1991 court pronouncement. They further document 
shifts in volatility among Delaware firms following the court ruling but also acknowledge that 
they “… do not know which managerial choices actually drive risk and what managerial or board 
decisions led to a change of risk after the ruling” (Becker and Stromberg 2012).   
Shifts in risk-return trade-offs in response to changes in the agency environment are 
interesting in their own right but also crucial to understanding changes in the value of 
shareholder and debtholder claims. Risk-return tradeoffs and their implications for shareholder 
and debtholder claims are particularly relevant in the context of firms’ attempts at innovation. 
Innovation is considered essential for the long-term financial viability of firms and is associated 
with increases in future earnings, to the potential benefit of both shareholders and debtholders 
(Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffam 2012, Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li 2013, Aghion, Van 
Reenen and Zingales 2013). However, fostering innovation requires risky R&D investments and 
a “tolerance for failure” (Holmstrom, 1989, Manso 2011, Acharya, Baghai and Subramaniam 
2013, Tian and Wang 2014). This poses a challenging trade-off for managers: innovation can 
enhance a firm’s product market competitiveness and increase long-term earnings, but negative 
outcomes resulting from risky investments in innovation can accelerate financial distress.  
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We posit that newly expanded fidicuciary duties toward debtholders and the resulting 
changes in the managers’ approach to risk-return trade-offs post-1991 affected managerial 
decisions in a number of ways. Conditional on engaging in risky R&D investments, managers at 
Delaware firms likely exhibited a preference for projects yielding tangible and more certain 
benefits in the form of patents.2 Thus, we examine whether the Delaware court ruling led to 
greater “innovation efficiency”, that is, a higher patent yield per dollar of R&D investment 
undertaken after the event.  
Our empirical analyses rely on a difference-in-difference research design: we examine 
changes in Delaware firms from before to after the 1991 court ruling and compare them to 
contemporaneous changes in non-Delaware firms. All our regression results include firm and 
year fixed effects, making it unlikely that our results are driven by firm-level or time-specific 
characteristics. We find that in the post-1991 period, Delaware firms exhibit a significant 
increase in innovation efficiency, consistent with a preference for R&D projects with more 
tangible and certain benefits. As expected, the results are more pronounced for firms near 
insolvency, but they are also significant for firms further away from insolvency, suggesting that 
the Delaware court ruling influenced fully solvent firms’ investment choices as well.  
In our next analysis, we consider overall R&D expenditures. As Aghion et al. (2013) 
point out, “ Innovating requires taking risk and forgoing current returns in the hope of future 
ones”.  A prudent long-term focus near insolvency would require that managers restrict 
expenditures, particularly risky ones, sacrificing some opportunities for innovation if necessary 
as they concentrate on reaching financial stability. Thus, we expect Delaware firms close to 
insolvency at the time of the 1991 ruling to reduce their overall R&D expenditures. It is not clear 
2 Patent counts and citations have been the most widely used meaures of innovation output in the academic literature 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1975, Griliches 1990, Francis and Smith 1995, Kogan et al. 2012, Acharya et al. 2013, 
Aghion et al. 2013, Hirshleifer et al. 2013, Hsu, Tian and Xu 2014, Tian and Wang 2014).  
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whether and, if so, what effect the ruling would have had on R&D expenditures of firms further 
away from insolvency. The threat of bankruptcy is not imminent for such firms, implying they 
have weaker incentives to reduce R&D expenditures.  
 We find that R&D expenditures declined significantly among near-insolvent Delaware 
firms after 1991, consistent with such firms restricting risky R&D expenditures.3 Interestingly, 
the effect is not just weaker but actually of the opposite sign among Delaware firms further away 
from insolvency: we find that they increase their R&D expenditures. These patterns are 
reinforced when we examine total innovation output, measured by patent counts and patent 
citations. Following the 1991 court ruling, total innovation output declined for Delaware firms 
close to insolvency while it increased for those further away from insolvency.  
Becker and Stromberg (2012) document a post-1991 decline in ROA volatility for 
Delaware firms near insolvency but a corresponding increase for Delaware firms further away 
from bankruptcy. They state “…we do not have a good explanation for why volatility actually 
increased after the ruling for firms further from distress…” Our results point to a possible 
explanation. Following the 1991 court ruling, near-insolvent Delaware firms, as expected, 
limited their exposure to risky investments and targeted investments with more certain benefits, 
which allowed them to concentrate on avoiding bankruptcy. On the other hand, financially 
healthy Delaware firms expanded their R&D activities leading to higher innovation output.  
The results with respect to Delaware firms far from insolvency point to the possibility of 
an unanticipated consequence of the Delaware court ruling. Consideration of near-bankruptcy 
3 In additional tests, we confirm that capital expenditures (excluding R&D) exhibit a significant increase across all 
Delaware firms, irrespective of their proximity to insolvency, consistent with Becker and Stromberg (2012). Thus 
near insolvent Delaware firms exhibit a decline in R&D but an increase in capital expenditures. The explanation for 
this discrepancy between R&D and capital expenditures probably lies in the greater uncertainty and risk, as well as 
the lack of collaterizable assets, of R&D projects (Kothari, Laguerre and Leone 2002). Please see Section 4.5.2 for 
an expanded discussion of this issue.   
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scenarios is not likely to have a first-order effect on managerial choices at fully solvent firms. 
However, Credit Lyonnais was covered extensively in the media and generated intense 
discussion regarding the altered agency dynamic and increased uncertainty regarding near-
insolvency situations.4 Thus, the ruling conceivably made shareholders and managers of fully 
solvent firms more keenly aware of the new complexities surrounding near-insolvency situations, 
leading to intensified efforts at ensuring that their firms never approach bankruptcy. As part of 
their efforts, such firms sought out R&D projects with more certain benefits, at the same time 
increasing their R&D investments. The net consequence was an increase in the level of 
innovation for firms further away from insolvency following the ruling. Financially healthy firms 
were able to increase R&D investments presumably because they enjoy greater risk-bearing 
capacity and lower susceptibility to creditor interference. Our results suggest that such firms 
exploited these advantages to enhance innovation output.   
We interpret our collective evidence as indicating that the Credit Lyonnais ruling 
strengthened Delaware firms’ focus on long-term value creation, with firms selecting the 
appropriate long-term focus based on their contemporaneous financial health.  Firms close to 
insolvency restricted risk-taking to avoid bankruptcy, raising the probability of their survival, 
and those further away from insolvency expanded their innovation attempts, reducing the 
probability of their insolvency in the long run.  
4 According to Becker and Stromberg (2012), who provide some detail on the press coverage following the 1991 
court ruling, the court ruling was immediately covered by newswires from Reuters, Dow Jones and PR Newswire. 
24 newspapers covered the case and the ruling on the day or the following day of the ruling, including the Wall 
Street Journal, New York Times, Financial Times, Washington Post, Chicago Sun-Times, and San Francisco 
Chronicle. In just three months after the court ruling, the Credit Lyonnais case was covered 62 times in mainstream 
press and newswires. Even though the Credit Lyonnais case technically refers to all stakeholders, the interpretation 
of the court ruling and subsequent legal cases anchor on creditors. For example, see Geyer V Ingersoll Publications 
(1992), Weaver V Kellogg (1997), and Medlin V Wells Fargo Bank (2007). According to Becker and Stromberg, 
“The case is extensively cited by other cases, legal scholars and practicing lawyers.” T hey report that a Lexis-Nexis 
search in July 2009 yielded 169 citations and the Westlaw database reported 612 citations over the same period, 
including 56 legal cases.  
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The hypothesis that the 1991 court ruling intensified managers’ focus on long-term 
profitability at Delaware firms has an interesting testable corollary: these managers are also less 
likely to pursue short-term objectives. Managers often face enormous capital market pressures to 
continuously meet/beat quarterly earnings targets (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). The 
focus on short-term targets can be counter-productive as it potentially distracts managers from 
pursuing long-term goals such as innovation (Aghion et al 2013). Furthermore, meeting or 
beating short-term earnings targets incentivizes managers to engage in myopic actions and 
earnings overstatements that can be detrimental to long-run value (see Bushee 1998, Graham et 
al. 2005, Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Brochet, Loumioti and Serafeim 2014, 
Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 2014). We expect that Delaware firms’ propensity to just 
meet/beat short-term targets by small margins and/or to engage in earnings manipulation declines 
after the 1991 court ruling.   
Consistent with our expectations, our analyses reveal a reduced post-1991 frequency of 
narrowly meeting or beating short-term analysts’ targets as well as lower earnings management 
at the Delaware firms. While the declines in narrow meet/beat frequencies and earnings 
management occur irrespective of a firm’s proximity to bankruptcy, they are more pronounced 
for firms close to insolvency. The results are indicative of managers refraining from a short-term 
focus on preserving appearances, particularly when they have to direct their efforts` towards 
steering the firm away from insolvency.   
The heightened long-term focus at Delaware firms likely results from the court ruling 
better aligning the interests of managers, debtholders and equityholders with longer horizons. 
Importantly, equityholders tend to be heterogeneous in their investment horizons and trading 
frequencies (Bushee 1998, Matsumoto 2002). Institutional investors with longer investment 
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horizons are especially likely to appreciate an intensified long-term focus and reduced myopia 
(Francis and Smith 1995, Bushee 1998, Roychowdhury 2006, Aghion et al. 2013). Accordingly, 
we examine whether the 1991 court ruling is followed by a shift in the equity investor base of 
Delaware firms towards dedicated institutional investors, who typically have longer horizons and 
prefer stable growth in their investments (see Bushee 1998, 2001). Transient institutional 
investors, on the other hand, are frequent traders with shorter horizons and encourage focus on 
meeting or beating short-term earnings targets, even via myopic earnings management if 
necessary (Bushee 1998, Matsumoto 2002). Such investors are unlikely to find the new focus at 
Delaware firms suit their investment horizons. Indeed, we observe that investments by dedicated 
institutional investors rise among Delaware firms following the 1991 court ruling, while those by 
transient institutional investors decline. The shifts are significant for firms away from 
insolvency, but even more pronounced for firms close to bankruptcy.5  
Our results on changes in innovation activities, decline in earnings myopia and finally 
increases in dedicated institutional ownership serve to collectively point to a longer-term focus at 
Delaware firms after the 1991 court ruling.  In additional tests, we confirm that our results on the 
above shifts are driven by firms with non-zero leverage and firms in industries with patents. 
Consistent with the change in firm focus being net beneficial for the value of both shareholders’ 
and debtholders’ claims, we also document that Delaware firms exhibit an increase in Tobin’s Q 
and a decline in default risk after the 1991 court ruling. 
5 The literature documents that institutional investors “vote with their feet”  (Parrino, Sias and Starks 2003). In other 
words, dissatisfaction with an investee firm’s managerial policies can motivate them to reduce their ownership of the 
corresponding firm. This is consistent with our finding that transient instituions reduce their ownership of Delaware 
firms. In addition, our results also point to another facet of institutional shareholders voting with their feet: they 
“step into” stocks whose policies appeal to them, as evidenced by dedicated institutions increasing their ownership 
of Delaware firms.   
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Our study contributes to the literature by providing direct empirical evidence on the 
influence of agency environment on firm focus. The 1991 Credit Lyonnais court ruling allows us 
to examine specific managerial choices in response to an exogenous agency shock. It clearly 
tilted the agency environment in favor of debtholders; yet the longer-term focus it induced 
among managers of Delaware firms ultimately also benefited shareholders. Our results thus 
highlight that a shock to any single aspect of the agency environment can have reverberating 
consequences throughout the firm. 
The virtual impossibility of complete contracting implies that neither shareholders nor 
their agents (i.e., the board of directors and managers) can credibly commit ex ante to 
contractually protecting debtholders’ interests when firms are near insolvency (Zingales 1998). 
For example, short-term-oriented shareholders can pressure managers at financially troubled 
firms to engage in “risk-shifting”, i.e. pursue risky projects that reduce the probability of survival 
but transfer wealth from debtholders. The exogenous legal validation in the 1991 ruling of 
management’s fiduciary responsibility towards both shareholders and debtholders in near-
insolvent firms thus created a commitment to long-term value creation probably not achievable 
via explicit contracts.  
Furthermore, our results suggest that the widely publicized ruling drew the attention of 
even financially healthy firms to the complexities surrounding near-insolvency situations. In 
doing so, it served to align the interests of managers, debtholders and longer-term shareholders in 
ensuring that their firms not approach near-insolvency. As a consequence, even fully solvent 
Delaware firms transferred their focus from meeting/beating short-term targets to expanding 
innovation activities. The shifts we document away from transient institutional ownership 
towards dedicated are particularly pertinent in this context. They suggest that the ruling triggered 
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a mitigation of the influence of shareholders who promote a short-term focus among managers 
and distract them from generating long term value.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the 1991 Credit Lyonnais case, 
the associated court ruling and its implications in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the sample, the 
data and our dependent variables. Our results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Setting 
2.1 The Legal Case 
Prior to Credit Lyonnais v Pathe Communications, conventional legal understanding was 
that directors and managers did not bear fiduciary responsibilities towards creditors, unless firms 
were already in bankruptcy. The Delaware court ruling in the Credit Lyonnais case in 1991 was 
instrumental in setting a legal precedent (for firms incorporated in Delaware) that directors and 
managers also owe fiduciary duties to creditors when firms are in the “vicinity of insolvency”, 
but crucially, still solvent.6  
The details of the Credit Lyonnais case are as follows. The private company that emerged 
out of leveraged buyout (LBO) of MGM Corporation from Time Warner ran into financial 
difficulties almost immediately after its formation. Five months after the LBO, trade creditors 
forced MGM into bankruptcy. MGM’s exit from bankruptcy relied heavily on a credit line of 
$145 million from Credit Lyonnais. MGM’s controlling shareholder at the time (Pathe 
Communication) also signed a corporate governance agreement with Credit Lyonnais. 
Exercising its contractual rights under this agreement, Credit Lyonnais subsequently replaced 
MGM’s directors inclusive of the CEO. In an attempt to re-gain control over MGM by paying 
down the Credit Lyonnais debt, Pathe Communication tried to raise money for the payoff by 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the ruling, see Memorandum opinion, Civ. A. No. 12150, Court of Chancery of 
Delaware, New Castle County.   
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selling MGM’s interest in an overseas subsidiary. The newly-appointed management and 
directors vetoed Pathe Communication’s move. Pathe claimed that the new management was in 
breach of the fiduciary duties they owed to MGM stockholders by favoring creditors’ interests. 
On December 12 1991, the Delaware Chancery Court court ruled in favor of the new 
(Credit Lyonnais-appointed) management. The court held that “the new management was 
appropriately mindful of the potential differing interests between the corporation and its 
controlling shareholder. At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a 
board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise”. A crucial component of this ruling, upheld in all related subsequent court 
opinions, was the stress on managers’ primary responsibility to serve in the best interest of the 
corporation rather than any specific class of stakeholders.  
 In a further clarification, Footnote 55 of the court’s pronouncement noted that “…in 
managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, 
circumstances may arise when the right course to follow for the corporation may diverge from 
the choice that stockholders...would make”. The ruling, particularly Footnote 55, was 
immediately considered a path-breaking breach with existing legal and business understanding 
and practice and triggered widespread media coverage.7  
The ruling generated considerable comment and controversy. The increase in fiduciary 
responsibilities of managers towards debtholders in the vicinity of insolvency is a distinct 
concept from the creditor-friendliness of the legal environment in bankruptcy. Even though the 
bankruptcy code does not apply to near-insolvent firms, Credit Lyonnais created uncertainty 
about the relative superiority of shareholders’ versus debtholders’ claims in such firms. Indeed, 
7 Please see the Introduction (footnote 5) for a discussion of press coverage and publicity for the Credit Lyonnais 
court ruling. 
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the exact definition of the “vicinity of insolvency” and the nature of additional obligations and 
potential liabilities of directors and managers in that vicinity were intensely debated (see for 
example, Sathy 2001).  
Delaware court pronouncements in relatively recent times (2004 and 2007) are perceived 
as partial roll-backs of the influence of the 1991 Credit Lyonnais decision. The 2004 Delaware 
Chancery Court ruling (Production Resources v. NCT) and the 2007 Delaware Supreme Court 
ruling (North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc., v. Gheewalla) both 
opine that creditors cannot sue directors and managers directly for breach of fiduciary duties, 
unless these duties arise from already-existing contractual arrangements. The 2004 and 2007 
Delaware cases received much less publicity relative to Credit Lyonnais. Becker and Stromberg 
(2012) fail to find any significant changes around these later cases, suggesting that the perception 
of managers’ fiduciary responsibility towards all stakeholders in near-insolvent-firms survived in 
spite of the partial reversals. Indeed, both court rulings explicitly re-assert the duties of directors 
and managers to the corporation and good-faith preservation of its value for all stakeholders. 
Indeed the 2004 Production Resources court ruling further asserted: “ In other words, Credit 
Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who claimed that the directors had a 
duty to undertake extreme risk so long as the company did not technically breach any legal 
obligations.”  
The exact implications of the Credit Lyonnais are debated to this day. But at the time of 
the 1991 court ruling, any uncertainty about the impact and scope was still largely regarded as 
“unidirectional” (Becker and Stromberg 2012). In other words, there was genera l and widespread 
agreement that, in light of the context, the ruling favored greater than existing protection for 
debtholders’ interests in near-insolvency firms. For example, Forbes (1992) concluded that the 
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Credit Lyonnais court ruling implied that “when a company is in serious trouble, the directors’ 
responsibility shifts somewhat in the direction of the creditors”. Indeed, the ruling imposed that 
at a critical juncture when shareholders are at risk of losing control of the firm, directors and 
managers of the company can no longer take actions solely in the best interests of the 
shareholders. One example of shareholders extracting value from a nearly-bankrupt corporation 
is demanding that managers take on extremely risky projects in the hope of high payoffs on the 
“upside” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Warga and Welch 1993, Parrino and Weisbach 1999, 
Eisdorfer 2008). The Credit Lyonnais ruling considerably weakened shareholders’ legal standing 
to influence managers to pursue such projects.  
Empirically, the 1991 Delaware court ruling provides a powerful identification strategy 
because it applies solely to firms incorporated in Delaware (that is, “Delaware” firms). This 
facilitates a direct comparison of changes in Delaware firms before and after the 1991 ruling 
with corresponding calendar-time changes in non-Delaware firms, who were unaffected by the 
ruling.  
Becker and Stromberg (2012) are the first to study the consequences of the ruling. They 
find that near-insolvent Delaware firms exhibit an increase in equity issues and capital 
expenditures, along with a decline in ROA volatility after the event. They argue that this is 
consistent with the Delaware court ruling alleviating the agency problems arising from debt-
overhang and risk-shifting close to insolvency. They further document that Delaware firms on 
average experience an increase in leverage, a decrease in covenant frequency, and positive 
equity announcement returns upon the pronouncement of the ruling. They argue that this is 
consistent with debtholders and equityholders of all Delaware firms anticipating the benefits 
associated with the alleviation of agency issues near insolvency. Their study does not, however, 
12 
 
address the issue of specific managerial choices, particularly with respect to risk-taking, that 
generate the observed mitigation in agency costs. We build on their work by providing evidence 
on how the shock to agency environment affects managers’ approach to risk-taking and their 
specific actions.  
Aier, Chen and Pevzner (2014) report evidence consistent with a stronger influence of 
debtholders on Delaware firms’ financial reporting policy following the Credit Lyonnais ruling; 
they document an increase in Delaware firms’ reporting conservatism after the 1991 court 
ruling.8 Our results on earnings management speak to the effect of the ruling on a different 
aspect of financial reporting – a firm’s reduced use of discretion to inflate financial results – and 
arise from a distinct mechanism: a shift away from myopic goals.  
We restrict our analysis to three years before and three years after the ruling to avoid the 
possibility of “leakage”, that is, any influence of the Delaware ruling on legal cases of a similar 
nature outside of Delaware. A shorter window also captures the period of time following the 
Delaware ruling when the perception that managers in near-insolvency Delaware firms are 
responsible towards both shareholders and debtholders was the strongest and the most pervasive. 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample 
We begin with all publicly listed firms from the Compustat/CRSP database with non-
missing state of incorporation information over the sample period from 1988 to 1994. Our actual 
analysis concentrates on firm-years between 1988 and 1990 and those between 1992 and 1994. 
The one-year break in 1991 facilitates clearly-defined “before” and “after” periods straddling the 
1991 Delaware court ruling. We exclude firms in financial industries (sic 6000-6999) and 
8 Tan and Wongsunwai (2014) find similar evidence. 
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utilities (sic 4000-4999). We require the availability of COMPUSTAT and CRSP data necessary 
to construct our control variables: ROA, total assets, firm age, leverage, capital expenditures, 
equity issues, equity volatility, and ROA volatility. These variables are defined in Appendix A. 
The sample for every test includes the maximum number of observations available for the test, 
given the data requirements inclusive of dependent variables. As an example, our analysis with 
patent counts includes 2,075 firms and 11,803 firm-year observations between 1988 and 1994. 
Firms are classified as treated (or “Delaware” firms) if they are incorporated in Delaware and 
hence are affected by the rulings, with the rest classified as “controls”. According  to this rule, we 
classify 1,062 firms as treated and 1,013 firms as controls.9  
3.2. Main variables of interest 
3.2.1 Innovation 
Following prior research, we employ measures of innovation efficiency that capture 
innovation output (patent count and citations) per unit of innovation input (R&D expenses) 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2013). We use firm-level patent data as output-based measures of innovation 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1975, Griliches 1990, Hirshleifer et al. 2013, Hsu et al. 2014).10 Griliches 
(1990) outlines the patent claim process and concludes that patents serve as good indices of 
contemporaneous attempts to innovate. Using the patent records of all public firms in the 
9 Compustat backfills incorporation data; i.e., at any point in time, it reports the current state of incorporation. This 
introduces the potential of misclassification and measurement errors. Prior studies have shown that firms rarely re-
incorporate. For example, Becker and Stromberg (2012) examine firm re-incorporation over 1990-2006 using the 
Risk-Metrics database and find that annual frequency of re-incorporation is around 1%. To further address this 
backfilling issue as it pertains to our sample, we obtain historical state of incorporation information from Moody’s 
yearly Industry Manual. Over our sample period of 1988-1994, 169 firms changed state of incorporation, among 
which 24 firms moved out of Delaware and 145 firms re-incorporated into Delaware. We re-estimate our analysis 
using historical state of incorporation and our conclusions are unchanged.  
10 For each patent granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 2006, the database 
provides the following information: the patent assignees (i.e., the firm that filed the patent application), the 
Compustat-matched firm identifiers (GVKEY), the technology class, the filing date (i.e., the date on which the firm 
filed the patent application), a list of prior patents that are cited by the designated patent, and a list of subsequent 
patents that cite the designated patent through 2006. These details allow us to measure the innovation activities of 
each public firm along multiple dimensions. 
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updated NBER patent database, we construct two metrics of innovation output: patent counts and 
patent citations. Patent count (Patents) is the number of successful patent applications filed by 
firm i during year t that are eventually granted by the USPTO. This proxy captures firm 
innovation output from a quantitative perspective, and has been widely used in economics 
research (e.g., Griliches 1990, Hall 1993). The second measure of firm-level innovation output is 
qualitative. This proxy (Citations) represents the number of patent citations received by all 
successful patent applications filed by firm i in year t. Prior studies often use the number of 
citations received by a patent to measure the patent’s technological contribution and economic 
value (Trajtenberg 1990, Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel 1999, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
2005, Aghion et al. 2013). We adjust the number of citations received by each patent by the 
technology category and application year, as suggested by Hall et al. (2005), to correct for 
truncation bias because it takes time for patents to accumulate citations.  
To obtain measures of innovation efficiency, we scale each innovation output metric by 
R&D expenses. Following prior research, we lead all innovation measures relative to R&D 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2013, Hsu et al. 2014). Our primary measure computes innovation efficiency 
for year t as Patentst+1/R&Dt and Citationst+1/R&Dt.
11 Nevertheless, we also consider innovation 
proxies with with leads of up to two years (i.e., innovation in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D 
in year t) in our robustness checks and obtain consistent results.12  
11 R&D values are missing for a large fraction of firms in COMPUSTAT. Following prior literature, we assign the 
value of 0 to missing observations (Roychowdhury 2006). However, this still results in innovation efficiency 
measures not being defined for firms with no R&D expenses and a smaller sample size in models which use 
innovation efficiency measures as the dependent variables. Observations with 0 R&D are, however, included in our 
tests of R&D investments. This allows for the possibility that a firm with no R&D initiated such investments after 
the court ruling or vice versa.   
12 Two studies in particular point to the appropriateness of matching R&D to the innovation output occurring in the 
first year or in the first two years following the R&D expenditiures. Griliches (1990) discusses how patent 
applications tend to be filed concurrently with the R&D that generates them and are thus are good indicators of 
contemporaneous innovation attempts. Furthermore, Hall et al. (2005) point out that in the late 1980s and early 
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Along with innovation efficiency, we also examine investment in innovation: research 
and development expenses as a fraction of total assets (R&D/Assets). R&D expenditures entail 
significant risk (Chan, Lakonishok and Souigiannis 2001, Kothari et al. 2002, Hirshleifer et al. 
2013, Hsu et al. 2014). As a result, this variable captures not only the long-term focus of the 
firm’s investments but also the firm’s appetite for operational risk.    
Finally, in additional analysis we examine the effect of the Delaware court ruling on the 
total unscaled innovation output: patent count and patent citations. We use the logarithmic value 
of one plus patent count or citation count to mitigate skewness in firm-level patents and citations. 
3.2.2 Earnings manipulation 
Following prior literature, we measure earnings manipulation in a number of ways. First, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckauser (1999) find a much higher 
percentage of firms that narrowly meet or beat earnings targets relative to firms that narrowly 
miss, a pattern they point to as indicative of earnings management. To construct a variable that 
captures firms meeting or narrowly beating analyst forecasts, we first obtain the consensus 
median analyst consensus forecast before the earnings announcement from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. We then construct the indicator variable I(Beat), 
which equals one if the earnings announcement is equal to the consensus forecast or exceeds this 
forecast by two cents or less, and zero otherwise. 
We also examine abnormal accruals (Abn_Accruals), which have been widely used to 
study earnings management (Dechow and Dichev 2002, McNichols 2002, Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley 2005). Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002), we estimate the 
1990s 85% of all patent grants occurred within two years following the patent applications, with about half of them 
occurring within the first year after application.  
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following model by year for each of the 48 Fama-French industries, requiring at least 20 
observations for each estimation: 
TAi,t = α0 + α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4∆Sales,t+ α5PPEi,t+εi,t       
CFO is operating cash flow, measured as the sum of net income, depreciation and 
amortization, and changes in current liabilities, minus changes in current assets, scaled by 
average total assets. ∆Sales refers to change in sales revenue and PPE denotes property, plant, 
and equipment. The residuals from the above regression serve as our measure of abnormal 
accruals.  
 Finally, we measure real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006). We focus on two 
primary metrics: the abnormal levels of discretionary expenses and production costs. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we model the normal levels 
of discretionary expenses and production costs with the following cross-sectional regressions for 
each industry and year: 
Prodi,t = α0+ α11 / Assetsi,t-1 + α2Salesi,t + α3∆Salesi,t + α4∆Salesi,t-1 + εi,t  
DiscExpi,t = α0+ α11 / Assetsi,t-1 + α2Salesi,t-1 + εi,t                         
Prod is production costs, computed as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory, 
and DiscExp is discretionary expenses, computed as the sum of advertising expenses, R&D 
expenses, and SG&A expenses.  Assetst-1 is assets at the end of year t-1 (i.e., at the beginning of 
year t), Sales is sales revenue, and ∆Sales is change in sales revenue; Sales and ∆Sales are scaled 
by assets at the beginning of the year. The residuals from the respective regressions yield 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. Abnormal production costs are 
denoted RM_Prod; we multiply abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one so that the 
resultant measure, denoted RM_DiscExp, is increasing in the level of earnings management.  
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  Using the above estimates of abnormal production costs and discretionary expenses, we 
then construct a comprehensive measure of real earnings management. The composite measure, 
RM_Total, is computed by adding RM_Prod and RM_DiscExp.13  
3.2.3 Shareholder clientele 
 To determine the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, we obtain the 
institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. 
We compute Institutions as the total shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares 
outstanding.  
We then identify the institutional ownership type by using the classification developed by 
Bushee (1998).14 Briefly, Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors based on investment 
horizon using a factor analysis and cluster analysis approach. In the paper, we focus on the 
ownership by two types of institutional investors, dedicated institutions and transient institutions. 
Dedicated (transient) institutions have low (high) portfolio turnover and less (more) diversified 
portfolios. We compute Dedicated (Transient) as the total shares held by dedicated (transient) 
institutions divided by total shares outstanding. 
3.2.4 Proximity to insolvency  
Our empirical analyses include examinations of differential effects depending on the 
firm’s proximity to insolvency. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Becker and Stromberg 
(2012), we measure proximity to insolvency using Merton’s distance to default measure. 
13 We refrain from using abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) as a measure of real earnings manipulation. 
Roychowdhury (2006) points out that the real earnings management methods available to managers can have 
countervailing effects on CFO. For example, while overproduction and aggressive sales discounts would generate 
unusually low CFO, aggressive curtailing of discretionary expenses can lead to higher abnormal CFO in the 
contemporaneous period. The net influence of real manipulation on abnormal CFO is thus ambiguous. 
14 The classification data is available at: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html  
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Merton’s (1974) model uses the market value of a firm’s equity in calculating its default risk. We 
construct the distance to default measure following Vassalou and Xing (2004) who employ 
Merton’s model to estimate the value of contingent claims on the firm’s assets.15   
Firms with Merton’s distance to default measure (hereafter the Merton measure) in the 
bottom quartile of the population in year 1990 (i.e., the year immediately before the passage of 
court ruling) are identified as financially distressed and close to insolvency. The indicator 
variable I(Near-Insolvency) is set equal to one for firms in the bottom quartile with respect to the 
Merton measure and zero otherwise.  
4. Results 
4.1 Research design 
We examine the economic consequences of an expansion of fiduciary duties towards 
debtholders, using this general difference-in-difference regression specification: 
       Yit = β0 + βi Post-1991t × I(Delaware)i + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit                (1) 
Y refers to the various proxies for innovation efficiency and R&D investments, earnings 
manipulation, and shareholder clientele. These proxies are described in detail in Section 3. i 
indexes firms and t time. The Post-1991 indicator is equal to one from 1992 to 1994, and zero 
from 1988 to 1990. There is a one-year break between the two three-year periods because the 
Delaware ruling occurred in 1991. The I(Delaware) indicator is equal to one in all sample years 
15 We obtain the estimated value of asset and volatility of asset from Maria Vassalou’s website. Vassalou and Xing 
(2004) calculate value of assets and volatility of assets using Black-Scholes (1973) formula: VE=VAN(d1)-Xe
-
rTN(d2), where d1=(ln(VA/X)+(r+1/2δA
2)T)/ δA√T and d2=d1- δA√T. VE denotes market value of equity, VA denotes 
value of assets, X denotes book value of debts that has maturity equal to T. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use an 
iterative procedure to estimate Value of asset (VA) and Volatility of Assets (δA).They use daily data from the past 12 
months to obtain an estimate of the volatility of equity, which is then used as an initial value for the estimation of δA. 
Using the Black-Scholes formula, and for each trading day of the past 12 months, they compute VA using VE as the 
market value of equity of that day. In this manner, they obtain daily values for VA. They then compute the standard 
deviation of those VA’s, which is used as the value of δA, for the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until the 
values of δA of two consecutive iterations converge at tolerance level of 10E-4. The distance to default is calculated 
as the difference between value of asset and short-term and long-term debt, divided by volatility of asset. 
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if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Xit represents our control variables: ROA, log of total 
assets, log of firm age, leverage, capital expenditures, indicator for equity issues, log of equity 
volatility, and log of ROA volatility (all defined in Appendix A). We follow the research design 
from Becker and Stromberg (2012) in including firm (FirmFE) and year (YearFE) fixed effects. 
As in their study, we do not include a I(Delaware) indicator separately as it is absorbed in the 
firm fixed effects. Similarly, the Post-1991 indicator separately is absorbed in year fixed effects. 
In all our regressions we cluster standard errors by the interaction of the state of incorporation 
and year (Becker and Strömberg, 2012).  
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics on our main variables of interest as well 
as the control variables. The number of observations (N) varies across variables depending on 
data availability. Therefore, for each variable, we report descriptive statistics for all observations 
with data available for that variable.16 In Table 1, Panel B we list the means for our variables of 
interest for both Delaware and non-Delaware firms before and after the Credit Lyonnais court 
ruling. After the court ruling, average innovation efficiency, earnings management, and 
shareholder clientele for Delaware firms change in the predicted direction relative to non-
Delaware firms. Briefly, Delaware firms exhibit a significantly greater increase in innovation 
efficiency metrics, a greater decline in earnings management, as well as a larger shift towards 
dedicated institutional ownership and away from transient institutional ownership. In addition, 
Tobin’s Q and Distance to Default increase for Delaware firms over and above the increase for 
non-Delaware firms. However, we refrain from drawing strong conclusions on statistical shifts 
based on these univariates. The next section discusses our multivariate tests which control for 
various firm characteristics, as well as firm and year fixed effects.  
16 We require that all control variables used in the regressions be available before we check for the availability of 
data to compute the dependent variables in those regressions. 
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4.2. Results on innovation  
Table 2 Panel A reports the results from estimating equation (1) on the full sample with 
our proxies for innovation efficiency as the dependent variables. In both columns the coefficient 
on Post-1991*I(Delaware) is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that on average 
Delaware firms improve innovation efficiency after the Credit Lyonnais court ruling. To get a 
sense for the economic magnitude of the changes in innovation efficiency, we evaluate the effect 
of Post-1991*I(Delaware) at the mean of the dependent variable. Patents/R&D increases by 
28.46% for Delaware firms as compared to non-Delaware firms; Citations/R&D by 47.18%.  
Both innovation and R&D in a given year are possibly influenced by R&D investments in 
previous years. We re-estimate all tests in Table 2 Panel A after controlling for R&D stock 
which captures the total R&D incurred over the previous three years and report them in Table 2 
Panel B.17. The additional data requirements for computing R&D stock lower the number of 
firm-years in the sample in Panel B. R&D stock is negatively associated with innovation 
efficiency, possibly because of its positive association with the denominator in both such 
measures (i.e., R&D in year t). Importantly, our main result on innovation efficiency increasing 
for Delware firms after the court ruling is robust to this inclusion.  
Results reported in Table 2 are based on the entire sample. In Table 3, we investigate 
changes in managers’ innovation efficiency and investments in R&D following the Delaware 
court ruling conditional on the firm’s proximity to insolvency. Table 3 adds to equation (1) two 
additional terms: Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) and Post-1991*I(Near-
Insolvency). In this expanded specification, the coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) captures 
the effect for Delaware firms away from insolvency, while the sum of the coefficient on Post-
1991*I(Delaware) and Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) captures the effect for firms 
17 Specifically, R&D Stock for year t is defined log (1+R&Dt-1 + R&Dt-2 + R&Dt-3). 
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that are near insolvency. We report p-values from F-tests of the sum of the two coefficients at the 
bottom of Table 3.  
In Panel A of Table 3, we find significantly positive coefficients of innovation efficiency 
on Post-1991*I(Delaware), suggesting that even Delaware firms away from insolvency improve 
their innovation efficiency. Focusing on firms near insolvency, we first conclude that Delaware 
firms near insolvency experience significant increases in innovation efficiency. The sum of Post-
1991*I(Delaware) and Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) is positive and significant 
with p-values smaller than 0.01 in columns (1) and (2). Moreover, in both columns the 
coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) is also positive and significant, 
suggesting that the improvements in innovation efficiency are more pronounced for firms near 
insolvency than firms away from insolvency. In other words, managers’ tendency to seek more 
certain benefits conditional on incurring R&D expenditures is more pronounced close to 
insolvency. Some of this incremental effect likely results from reduced risk-shifting when 
managers owe fiduciary responsibilities to both shareholders and debtholders near insolvency.  
In Panel B of Table 3, we focus on R&D expenditures and total innovation output, 
partitioned on whether firms were further away from insolvency or close to it at the time of the 
ruling. We find significantly positive coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) in column (1) of 
Panel B, suggesting that Delaware firms away from insolvency increase their R&D spending. In 
contrast, R&D spending of near-insolvent Delaware firms actually declines; the sum of Post-
1991*I(Delaware) and Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) is negative with the p-value 
smaller than 0.01 (F-tests reported at the bottom of the panel). Thus, near-insolvent Delaware 
firms choose projects with more certain benefits and higher innovation efficiency, but they 
22 
 
restrict overall R&D investments. Fully solvent Delaware firms exhibit the same preference for 
higher-innovation efficiency projects; in addition, they expand their R&D activities. 
In additional analyses reported in Table 3 Panel B we also examine the joint effect of 
variation in R&D expenditures and innovation efficiency on total innovation output, measured 
via overall patent count and patent citations. Our evidence so far indicates that innovation 
efficiency increased both for firms away from and near insolvency but near-insolvent Delaware 
firms reduced their R&D spending, making the overall effect on the innovation output 
ambiguous for near-insolvent firms. We use logarithms of one plus patent count or patent 
citation count to normalize the distributions of these variables. The coefficient on Post-
1991*I(Delaware) is positive and significant in columns (2) and (3) in Table 3, Panel B. Thus, 
innovation output increased for Delaware firms further away from insolvency after the Credit 
Lyonnais court ruling. Turning our attention to near-insolvent firms, we find that the coefficients 
on Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) are negative both with patent count and patent 
citations as the dependent variable. Moreover, F-tests reported at the bottom of Panel B suggest 
that the total innovation output declined for near-insolvent Delaware firms.      
Table 3 Panel C reports results with all innovation variables – innovation efficiency, 
R&D expenditures and innovation output – after controlling for R&D stock. The respective 
samples are smaller than those in Panels A and B because of the additional data required to 
compute R&D stock. As expected, leading R&D expenditures and innovation output measured 
via patent counts and patent citations are all positively associated with R&D stock. Furthermore 
Panel C confirms all primary results in Panels A and B with respect to shifts in R&D and 
innovation output after the Delware court ruling. 
4.3 Results on earnings manipulation 
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 We next investigate whether, as a result of the expansion of fiduciary duties toward 
debtholders, firm focus shifts away from short term goals, such as meeting-beating analysts’ 
expectations and earnings manipulation. Table 4, column (1) reports the results of a logistic 
regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator I(Beat) taking the value of one if 
earnings narrowly beat consensus analyst forecasts18. The coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) 
is negative and highly statistically significant with a p-value smaller than 0.01. This result 
implies that Delaware firms are generally less likely to narrowly beat analysts’ forecasts after the 
Credit Lyonnais court ruling, even after controlling for the potential time trends using the sample 
of non-Delaware firms. We further investigate whether these effects differ for firms near 
insolvency versus those further away in column (2) of Table 4. We find that the coefficients on 
Post-1991*I(Delaware) and on Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) are both 
significantly negative which indicates that both types of firms reduce their propensity to 
narrowly beat analysts’ forecasts but the effect is stronger for firms close to insolvency. These 
results are consistent with managers of Delaware firms in general eschewing a short-term focus 
on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by narrow margins if necessary. This trend is 
particularly pronounced in near-insolvent firms when managers presumably focus their efforts on 
avoiding insolvency, rather than myopically engaging in preserving appearances.  
In Table 5, we report the results from our examination of various measures of earnings 
manipulation. In column (1), we analyze abnormal accruals and find, consistent with our 
prediction, that Delaware firms exhibit significantly lower abnormal accruals after the court 
ruling. We are particularly interested in measures of real activities manipulation since it is more 
highly associated with negative future performance and value destruction than accruals 
18 We estimate the model using conditional logit model with firm fixed effect, in which all observations where there 
are no within-firm variations in the dependent variables are dropped from the estimation. 
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management (Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Kothari et al. 2014). Columns (2) through (4) in Table 5 
report the results for various measures of real activities manipulation. The coefficients in all 
columns are significantly negative with p-values smaller than 0.01 indicating a significant 
reduction in real activities manipulation for Delaware firms after the court ruling.  
In Table 6, we re-examine changes in earnings manipulation distinguishing between 
firms that are close to insolvency versus those further away. With respect to abnormal accruals 
(column (1)), the coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels indicating no significant changes in accrual-based earnings management 
among firms away from insolvency. Moreover, while the coefficient on Post-
1991*I(Delaware)*I(NearInsolvency) is significantly negative, the sum of coefficients on Post-
1991*I(Delaware) and Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency), which identifies the effect 
for firms close to default, is not significantly different from zero (F-test reported at the bottom of 
the panel). In contrast, there is a significant decline in real activities manipulation for both types 
of firms (columns (2) through (4)), with a more pronounced decline for firms near insolvency. 
These results support the notion that when fiduciary duties are expanded to debtholders, 
managers shift their focus away from myopic real activities manipulations which can have a 
detrimental effect on future operations.  
4.4. Results on shareholder clientele 
Our tests so far provide evidence that managers shift focus away from short-term and 
toward more long-term goals. In this section, we investigate whether the shareholder base 
changes to reflect this new focus. In particular, we re-estimate equation (1) using the total 
percentage ownership by institutional investors, the percentage ownership by dedicated 
institutional investors, and the percentage ownership by transient institutional investors as our 
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dependent variables. Table 7 reports the results of these OLS regressions. In columns (1) and (2), 
where the dependent variables are respectively the total percentage of institutional investors and 
the percentage of dedicated institutional investors, the coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, consistent with our predictions, 
institutional owners in general and dedicated owners with a long-term investment horizon in 
particular, add Delaware firms’ shares to their portfolios following the 1991 court ruling. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) in 
column (3) of Table 7, transient institutions reduce their holdings in Delaware firms. Given that 
these institutions emphasize short-term results, we view their exit as a natural consequence of the 
shift in the firm’s focus. When we evaluate economic magnitudes at the means of the dependent 
variable, we find that the fraction of dedicated investors increases by approximately 15%, while 
the fraction of transient investors decreases by a similar percentage: 13%. The percentage 
changes are estimated relative to the respective mean ownership values. This implies that for 
Delaware firms, mean dedicated institutional ownership rises from 7.07% to 8.14% while 
transient institutional ownership declines from 5.50% to 4.75% as a consequence of the 1991 
court ruling.  
In Table 8, we further examine changes in shareholder base splitting the firms into those 
near and away from insolvency. The increase in institutional ownership in general and dedicated 
institutional ownership in particular is evident for both types of firms (columns (1) and (2)) but 
the effect is significantly stronger for firms near insolvency (F-tests reported at the bottom of the 
table). Similarly, the decrease in the ownership by transient institutions is more pronounced for 
firms near insolvency (column 3). The results suggest that the shift in focus towards the longer-
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term and away from short-term targets is a more salient determinant of shifts in institutional 
ownership when firms are close to insolvency.  
4.5. Additional tests  
4.5.1 Changes in Firm Value and Default Risk 
 Our results so far suggest that Delaware firms experienced changes in firm focus towards 
long-term value creation and financial health after the 1991 court ruling. As a follow-up analysis, 
we test whether there was a corresponding increase in overall valuations of shareholders’ and 
debtholders’ claims, as well as a decline in default risk for Delaware firms. We proxy for firm 
value using Tobin’s Q, computed as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities divided by 
the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. We rely on the Merton Distance to Default 
measure discussed earlier in the paper to capture changes in default risk. Table 9 reports the 
results of our analyses.  
The coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) is significantly positive in column (1) 
indicating that Tobin’s Q increases for Delaware firms following the expansion of fiduciary 
duties to debtholders. The increase represents around 5% of the mean, implying that mean 
Tobin’s Q for Delaware firms rises from 1.53 to around 1.61 as a result of the court’s ruling.  
In column (2), the coefficient on Post-1991*I(Delaware) is significantly positive 
indicating a decline in default risk following the court ruling, consistent with the re-orientation in 
focus increasing Delaware firms’ ability to avoid financial distress. The increase in distance to 
default represents around 8.49% of the mean, implying that the Distance to Default metric for 
Delaware firms rises from 1.61 to around 1.75 as a result of the court’s ruling. 
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4.5.2 Capital expenditures 
 We find consistent evidence that R&D expenditures and total innovation output increase 
when firms are further away from insolvency but decline when firms are closer to insolvency. 
Becker and Stromberg (2012) find that capital expenditures (excluding R&D) exhibit a 
significant increase across all Delaware firms, irrespective of their proximity to insolvency. In 
untabulated results, we confirm Becker and Stromberg’s (2012) results with capital expenditures 
in our sample. The key difference between the results is that for Delaware firms close to 
insolvency, R&D expenditures decline while capital expenditures increase. The explanation for 
this discrepancy between R&D and capital expenditures probably lies in the greater uncertainty 
and risk associated with R&D projects (Chan et al. 2001, Kothari et al. 2002). Further, the 
success of R&D often depends on human expertise and the ability of the firm to leverage its 
knowledge base; to that extent, relative to conventional capital expenditures, R&D often involves 
fewer collaterizable fixed asset investments (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). These inherent 
differences can explain why in near-insolvent Delaware firms, debtholders would still be 
interested in limiting R&D investments, even as they place fewer restrictions on conventional 
capital expenditures. Given their expanded fiduciary duties towards debtholders, managers in 
such firms would thus restrict R&D after the 1991 court ruling.  
4.5.3 Robustness  
We conduct a variety of robustness exercises. First, we identify all industries that do not 
include any firm with patents, and exclude these industries from our tests on innovation 
involving patent frequency and citations. Our results are robust to this exclusion.  
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Second, we confirm that all our results inclusive of those we obtain with innovation and 
R&D, narrow meet/beats and earnings management as well institutional ownership are indeed 
driven by firms with non-zero leverage. Firms with zero leverage do not exhibit similar patterns.  
Third, we exclude from the analysis two non-Delaware states (Pennsylvania and Indiana) 
that already had statutes requiring managers to consider debt-holders’ interests near insolvency, 
similar to the stipulation for Delaware firms in the 1991 court ruling.19 Our results are not 
influenced by this exclusion.  
Fourth, we augment our multivariate regressions with state of location and industry fixed 
effects.20 These fixed effects control for geography-driven or industry-driven variation in 
economic conditions. Our results are similar after incorporating these fixed effects.  
Fifth, we repeat our analyses using Altman’s Z-Score (Altman 1968) to capture near-
insolvency instead of the Merton Distance to Default metric and find very similar results using 
this alternative measure of proximity to insolvency.  
Finally, our tests on a myopic focus rely on narrow meet/beats of analysts’ forecasts in 
Table 4, and on earnings management proxies in Tables 5 and 6. In robustness analysis, we 
consider a third metric that combines attributes of both: an indicator variable capturing whether a 
firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts and also simultaneously exhibits above-median measures 
of real earnings management. The results we obtain with this metric are similar to those we 
observe in Tables 5 and 6. In other words, real manipulation to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts 
declines for both fully solvent and near-insolvent Delaware firms, with the decline being more 
pronounced for the latter.   
19 A number of states allow corporate directors to take into account the interests of nonowners, e.g., employees, 
customers, creditors, and suppliers, in certain situations (notably, hostile takeovers). Prior to 1991, only Indiana and 
Pennsylvania required directors to consider non-owner interests (Becker and Stromberg 2012). 
20 In Table 4, we drop the firm fixed effects while adding state of location and industry fixed effects, as conditional 
logits models cannot accommodate as many fixed effects easily.  
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5. Conclusion 
Agency issues, particularly between debtholders and shareholders, have long been 
considered important determinants of crucial aspects of a firm, including capital structure, cost of 
capital, investment policy, firm strategy and firm value. The 1991 Credit Lyonnais court ruling, 
in a significant break with existing legal presumption, established a precedent for the expansion 
of fiduciary duties to debtholders when a firm is near insolvency. The ruling immediately and 
pervasively shifted perceptions about the balance of agency issues between shareholders and 
debtholders for Delaware firms, with debtholders widely perceived as having gained additional 
protection in near-insolvency situations.  
We exploit this natural shock to analyze the importance of agency issues in influencing 
firms’ strategic choices with respect to investments that impose risk but can also increase long-
term value and financial health. Our results are consistent with managers at Delaware firms 
adopting a long-term focus towards such investments. Innovation efficiency of R&D investments 
rises systematically across all Delaware firms, consistent with managers seeking out R&D 
projects with more certain benefits after the 1991 court ruling. R&D expenditures and total 
innovation output measured via patent counts and citations fall (rise) for firms close to (far from) 
insolvency. The patterns suggest that in Delaware firms already close to bankruptcy at the time 
of the court ruling, managers avoided bearing additional risk and sacrificed the benefits of 
innovation, consistent with them being mindful of their fiduciary responsibilities towards 
debtholders. In contrast, in Delaware firms not close to bankruptcy at the time of the court ruling, 
managers took advantage of the capacity to bear risk to increase their innovation efforts, with the 
goal of building competitiveness and avoiding financial distress in the long run. Reaffirming this 
shift towards a longer term focus, Delaware firms also exhibit an across-the board reduction in 
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myopic earnings manipulations and narrow meeting/beating of analysts’ forecasts. Interestingly, 
changes in shareholder base are consistent with this shift towards more long-term goals: 
dedicated investors characterized by longer investment horizon add Delaware firms to their 
portfolios, and transient institutions with a shorter investment horizon leave. Finally we find that 
shareholders and debtholders benefit from this new focus induced by the altered agency 
environment, as manifested in an increase in firm valuations (measured via Tobin’s Q) and 
stronger financial health (as measured via Merton’s distance to default metric).  
 Our results demonstrate that an exogenous shift in the agency environment favoring 
debtholders can shape real decisions at the firm in a manner that is actually beneficial for 
shareholders as well. Close to insolvency, the shift in the balance of power from shareholders to 
debtholders motivated firms to seek out projects with more certain benefits, facilitating their 
survival and their long-term ability to generate wealth for all stakeholders. Further away from 
insolvency, firms improved their product market competiveness via increased investments in 
innovation. This latter effect arises conceptually as a combination of two factors: (a) debtholders 
are more tolerant of risky innovation measures when firms are far away from insolvency; and (b) 
shareholders have a heightened aversion to being in near-bankruptcy situations, and hence focus 
on long-term actions to keep the firm from progressing towards insolvency.  
While we find that after the Delaware court ruling firms became more oriented towards 
the long-term and the investor base in Delaware firms shifted towards dedicated investors, we 
perceive the Credit Lyonnais court ruling as the catalyst that triggered these contemporaneous 
shifts. In other words, it is difficult to conceptually identify the precedence or the causal effect 
between the shifts towards a long-term focus and towards dedicated institutional ownership. 
Rather, they are likely manifestations of different parties to the firm simultaneously adapting to 
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the shock in the agency environment. Nevertheless, our research design does allow us to 
conclude that the expansion of fiduciary duties to debtholders was necessary to jump-start both 
the changes in firm focus and the shift in shareholder base. Indeed, while debtholders routinely 
include covenants in loan and bond agreements to restrict managerial choice, it is difficult to ex 
ante contractually ensure that managers will bear fiduciary duties towards debtholders if firms 
veer close to bankruptcy. The optimal course of action even for preserving debtholders’ interests 
near insolvency depends on the specific circumstances, which are unknown at time when the 
contracts are written. Thus, the exogenous Delaware court ruling is likely to have played a 
crucial role in inducing a shift in focus towards creating long-term value that could not have been 
achieved contractually.  
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
I(Delaware) Indicator equal to one if firms are incorporated in Delaware 
Post-1991 Indicator equal to one for years 1992-1994 and zero for years 1988-1990 
ROA Net income over lagged total asset 
Assets Total assets  
Firmage Number of years since a firm first appeared in CRSP 
Leverage Short term debt plus long term debt minus cash, all divided by total assets 
CAPX/Assets Capital expenditures over total assets 
I(Issue Equity) 
Following Baker, Stein and Wrugler (2003), indicator equal to one if stock issuance is positive, 
where stock issuance is calculated as change in common equity plus change in deferred tax 
minus change in retained earnings, all scaled by total assets 
Distance to  
 Default 
Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), who employ Merton’s model to estimate the value of 
contingent claims on the firm’s assets, Distance to Default is calculated as the difference 
between value of assets and short-term and long-term debt, divided by volatility of assets, where 
value of assets and volatility of assets are calculated using Black-Scholes formula and are 
obtained from Maria Vassalou's website. 
I(Near- 
Insolvency) 
Indicator equal to one if the Distance to Default measure is in the bottom quartile of the sample 
for sample firms in 1990, the year immediately preceding the Credit Lyonnais court ruling. 
Equity Volatility Log of annualized monthly standard deviation of the stock return in year t, taken from CRSP 
ROA Volatility Standard deviation of quarterly ROA in year t 
Number of 
Patents 
Total number of successful patent applications filed by firm i in year t+1 that are subsequently 
approved by the USPTO. We use the logarithm of the patent count plus 1 to mitigate skewness 
in the firm-level patent counts. The data is downloaded from NBER patent database. 
Patent Citations 
Total number of citations received by all patents that are filed by firm i in year t+1 and that are 
subsequently approved by the USPTO. The citation measure is adjusted for truncation following 
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005). We use the logarithmic citation count plus 1 to mitigate 
skewness in firm-level patents and citations. The data is downloaded from NBER patent 
database. 
R&D/Assets Research and development expenses in year t+1/Total assets in year t+1 
Patents/R&D Number of patents in year t+1 divided by R&D expense in year t 
Citations/R&D Number of patent citations in year t+1 divided by R&D expense in year t 
R&D Stock R&D Stock for year t is defined as log(1+R&Dt-1 + R&Dt-2 + R&Dt-3) 
I(Beat) 
Indicator equal to one if a firm's reported earnings are equal to analyst consensus or exceed 
analyst consensus by less than two cents, and zero otherwise. 
Abn_Accruals 
 
Accrual-based earnings management defined as  the residual from the following regression for 
each year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations: TAi,t = α0 + 
α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4∆Sales,t+ α5PPEi,t+εi,t 
RM_ Prod 
Real earnings management based on production costs defined as the residual from the following 
regression for each year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has at least 20 observations: 
Prodi,t = α0+ α11 / Assetsi,t-1 + α2Salesi,t + α3∆Salesi,t + α4∆Salesi,t-1 + εi,t 
RM_DiscExp 
Real earnings management based on discretionary expenses defined as minus one times the 
residual from the following regression for each year and each Fama-French 48 industry that has 
at least 20 observations: DiscExpi,t = α0+ α11 / Assetsi,t-1 + α2Salesi,t-1 + εi,t . Higher values of 
RM_DiscExp represent greater cuts in discretionary expenses and thus more earnings 
management.                     
RM_Total RM_ Prod + RM_DiscExp 
% Total Inst Percent of shares outstanding held by institutional investors  
% Ded Inst Percent of shares outstanding held by dedicated institutions 
% Transi Inst Percent of shares outstanding held by transient institutions 
Tobin's Q 
Market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the sum of book value of common 
equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value of assets. 
37 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). Panel A shows descriptive statistics and 
Panel B reports univariate comparison between Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms in the Pre- (1988-1990) and 
Post- (1992-1994) periods. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Median Std p25 p75 
Patents/R&D 9,400 0.239 0.000 0.683 0.000 0.228 
Citations/R&D 9,400 4.544 0.000 22.414 0.000 3.044 
R&D/Assets 19,589 0.036 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.044 
Number of patents 19,974 6.456 0.000 51.039 0.000 0.000 
Number of patent citations 19,974 131.463 0.000 1227.644 0.000 0.000 
I(Beat) 7,417 0.227 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.000 
Abn_Accruals 18,416 -0.001 0.006 0.101 -0.037 0.048 
RM_Prod 15,925 -0.011 -0.002 0.228 -0.127 0.115 
RM_DiscExp 16,663 -0.003 0.031 0.284 -0.111 0.159 
RM_Total 14,938 -0.027 0.029 0.448 -0.219 0.240 
% Total Inst 12,117 29.442 26.320 21.201 10.638 45.963 
% Ded Inst 12,117 8.521 6.654 7.750 2.242 12.689 
% Transi Inst 12,117 4.810 2.900 5.550 0.406 7.371 
Tobin's Q 19,786 1.670 1.305 1.127 1.012 1.912 
Distance to Default 12,813 1.872 1.782 1.875 0.926 2.835 
ROA 20,071 0.001 0.036 0.178 -0.031 0.088 
Total Assets 20,071 592.133 65.914 1754.936 17.057 286.873 
Firmage 20,071 16.303 10.000 14.764 6.000 23.000 
Leverage 20,071 0.100 0.130 0.338 -0.093 0.318 
Capx/Assets 20,071 0.078 0.050 0.098 0.023 0.094 
I(Issue Equity) 20,071 0.686 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
Equity Volatility 20,071 0.144 0.122 0.090 0.084 0.176 
ROA Volatility 20,071 0.024 0.011 0.039 0.005 0.026 
  
38 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Continued 
Panel B Univariate Comparison 
 
Delaware firms Non-Delaware firms 
diff-in-diff  
 
Pre Post  Pre Post  p-value 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean (Post-Pre)   
Patents/R&D 0.201 0.274 0.230 0.241 0.062 ** 0.030 
Citations/R&D 3.614 6.149 3.900 4.028 2.406 ** 0.010 
R&D/Assets 0.036 0.043 0.031 0.034 0.005 ** 0.025 
Number of Patents 6.303 6.949 5.837 6.552 -0.069 
 
0.962 
Number of Patent Citations 116.500 152.660 111.046 138.482 8.725 
 
0.803 
I(Beat) 0.200 0.240 0.177 0.269 -0.052 *** 0.009 
Abn_Accruals -0.001 -0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.007 ** 0.014 
RM_Prod -0.008 -0.019 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 
 
0.180 
RM_DiscExp -0.008 -0.037 0.024 0.020 -0.024 *** 0.007 
RM_Total -0.027 -0.077 0.004 0.003 -0.050 *** 0.001 
% Total Inst 29.155 33.256 25.485 28.572 1.014 
 
0.189 
% Ded Inst 7.031 10.585 6.571 8.934 1.192 *** 0.000 
% Transi Inst 5.492 5.116 4.207 4.423 -0.593 *** 0.004 
Tobin's Q 1.529 1.902 1.490 1.679 0.183 *** 0.000 
Distance to Default 1.609 1.969 1.823 2.046 0.136 ** 0.040 
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Table 2 Innovation Efficiency 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999).  All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A examines the effect of the court ruling on innovation efficiency and Panel B re-estimates the models from 
Panel A controlling for R&D stock. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and are clustered by the interaction of year and state of incorporation level. 
 
 Panel A: Complete Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 
Patents/R&D Citations/R&D 
     
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.068*** 2.144*** 
 
(3.779) (4.613) 
ROA 0.067 0.730 
 
(1.386) (0.470) 
Log Assets 0.007 0.237 
 
(0.472) (0.615) 
Log Firmage 0.080 -0.102 
 
(1.280) (-0.052) 
Leverage 0.069 1.742 
 
(0.829) (0.615) 
Capx/Assets -0.028 -1.029 
 
(-0.305) (-0.287) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.013 0.614 
 
(0.593) (0.913) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.040*** 1.268* 
 
(3.138) (1.956) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.010 -0.341 
 
(-1.625) (-1.326) 
   
Observations 9,400 9,400 
R-squared 0.507 0.378 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
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Table 2 Innovation Efficiency – Continued 
 
 Panel B: Sub-Sample with R&D Stock as Control Variable 
 (1) (2) 
 
Patents/R&D Citations/R&D 
     
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.076*** 2.548*** 
 
(3.483) (4.529) 
R&D Stock -0.070*** -2.196** 
 (-2.801) (-2.562) 
ROA 0.055 0.041 
 
(1.104) (0.026) 
Log Assets 0.026 0.787 
 
(1.262) (1.238) 
Log Firmage 0.149*** 1.020 
 
(2.642) (0.588) 
Leverage 0.090 2.135 
 
(0.974) (0.683) 
Capx/Assets -0.070 -2.840 
 
(-0.562) (-0.591) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.011 0.550 
 
(0.499) (0.831) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.040*** 1.330* 
 
(2.602) (1.766) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.010 -0.320 
 
(-1.400) (-1.110) 
    
Observations 8,952 8,952 
R-squared 0.508 0.377 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
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Table 3 Innovation and Proximity to Insolvency 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-
4999 and sic 6000-6999). Panel A examines the effect of the court ruling on innovation efficiency, and Panel B on R&D expenses as well as total innovation 
output. In Panel C, we re-estimate the models from Panels A and B controlling for R&D stock. The number of observations is reduced relative to those reported 
in Table 2 because of the availability of Merton’s Distance to Default measure. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
are clustered by the interaction of year and state of incorporation level. 
Panel A: Innovation Efficiency 
  (1) (2) 
 
Patents/R&D Citations/R&D 
 
  Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.032* 1.464*** 
 
(1.746) (3.476) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.182*** 6.478*** 
 
(3.201) (6.301) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.015 -0.333 
 
(0.266) (-0.321) 
ROA -0.001 0.500 
 
(-0.023) (0.426) 
Log Assets 0.023 0.657 
 
(1.177) (1.510) 
Log Firmage 0.019 -1.216 
 
(0.211) (-0.529) 
Leverage 0.017 2.610 
 
(0.191) (1.052) 
Capx/Assets -0.204* -8.467* 
 
(-1.791) (-2.029) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.020* 1.029*** 
 
(1.736) (2.867) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.053*** 1.480** 
 
(3.320) (2.038) 
Log ROA Volatility 0.001 -0.125 
 
(0.286) (-0.966) 
   
Observations 5,727 5,727 
R-squared 0.415 0.241 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0 
P-value 0.007 0.000 
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Table 3 Innovation and Proximity to Insolvency - Continued 
 Panel B: R&D and Innovation Output 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
R&D/Assets Log (1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) 
  
  Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.003*** 0.060*** 0.130*** 
 
(3.002) (3.513) (3.375) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) -0.006*** -0.069*** -0.149*** 
 
(-4.183) (-2.804) (-2.700) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.003** 0.008 0.024 
 
(2.269) (0.467) (0.530) 
ROA -0.009 0.061* 0.100 
 
(-1.012) (1.893) (1.386) 
Log Assets 0.001 0.099*** 0.209*** 
 
(1.161) (7.655) (8.304) 
Log Firmage -0.002 0.087*** 0.208*** 
 
(-1.268) (3.684) (2.969) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.073*** -0.148*** 
 
(-1.101) (-4.215) (-2.918) 
Capx/Assets -0.005 -0.103** -0.222* 
 
(-1.078) (-2.036) (-1.823) 
I(Issue Equity) -0.001 -0.006 -0.018 
 
(-1.080) (-0.768) (-1.036) 
Log Equity Volatility -0.000 0.009 0.010 
 
(-0.045) (0.951) (0.480) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.000 0.014*** 0.025*** 
 
(-0.068) (3.414) (2.783) 
 
 
   
Observations 11,650 11,803 11,803 
R-squared 0.785 0.938 0.897 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0 
 P-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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Table 3 Innovation and Proximity to Insolvency - Continued 
   Panel C: Innovation and R&D , Sub-Samples using R&D Stock as Control Variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Patents/R&D Citations/R&D R&D/Assets Log (1+Patents) Log(1+Citations) 
    
  Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.040** 1.764*** 0.003*** 0.054*** 0.112*** 
 
(2.034) (4.024) (2.786) (2.772) (3.029) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.191*** 6.678*** -0.006*** -0.071** -0.137*** 
 
(3.101) (6.479) (-4.316) (-2.676) (-2.834) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.007 -0.398 0.003** 0.019 0.042 
 
(0.112) (-0.374) (2.331) (0.720) (0.817) 
R&D Stock -0.086*** -2.755*** 0.003** 0.116*** 0.195*** 
 (-3.874) (-4.193) (2.035) (10.141) (6.277) 
ROA -0.030 -0.630 -0.005 0.110** 0.178* 
 
(-0.558) (-0.828) (-0.827) (2.100) (1.760) 
Log Assets 0.053** 1.719** 0.001* 0.072*** 0.160*** 
 
(2.348) (2.194) (1.962) (4.873) (4.550) 
Log Firmage 0.059 -0.359 -0.002 0.076** 0.158** 
 
(0.594) (-0.168) (-0.591) (2.180) (2.043) 
Leverage 0.026 2.741 -0.002 -0.062*** -0.138** 
 
(0.313) (1.153) (-0.792) (-3.627) (-2.521) 
Capx/Assets -0.284 -12.338* -0.004 -0.046 -0.119 
 
(-1.662) (-1.939) (-1.183) (-0.993) (-1.108) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.016 0.957** -0.000 -0.005 -0.016 
 
(1.419) (2.468) (-0.755) (-0.470) (-0.533) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.056*** 1.604** -0.001 0.005 -0.003 
 
(3.325) (2.046) (-0.589) (1.121) (-0.217) 
Log ROA Volatility 0.000 -0.137 0.000 0.015*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.104) (-1.063) (0.120) (3.838) (2.856) 
 
   
     
Observations 5,558 5,558 11,241 11,394 11,394 
R-squared 0.415 0.239 0.791 0.941 0.903 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0 
P-value 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.005 
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Table 4 Narrow Meet/Beats of Analyst Forecasts 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We estimate the model using conditional 
logit model with firm fixed effects, in which all observations where there are no within firm variations in the 
dependent variables will be dropped from the estimation. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of year and 
state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
I(Beat) I(Beat) 
      
Post-1991*I(Delaware) -0.310*** -0.251** 
 
(-2.93) (-2.04) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) 
 
-0.915*** 
  
(-2.58) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) 
 
0.128 
  
(0.36) 
ROA 2.906*** 2.982*** 
 
(6.53) (4.31) 
Log Assets -0.076 -0.086 
 
(-0.89) (-0.69) 
Log Firmage 0.030 0.397** 
 
(0.15) (2.23) 
Leverage -0.990*** -0.893** 
 
(-3.88) (-2.42) 
Capx/Assets 0.038 -0.202 
 
(0.10) (-0.29) 
I(Issue Equity) -0.069 0.038 
 
(-1.41) (0.60) 
Log Equity Volatility -0.006 -0.069 
 
(-0.07) (-0.56) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.215*** -0.172*** 
 
(-6.46) (-4.08) 
     
Observations 4,274 3,083 
R-squared 0.039 0.038 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0   
P-value   0.000 
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Table 5 Earnings Manipulation 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
All dependent variables are signed such that earnings management is increasing in more positive values. T-statistics 
are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of year and 
state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Abn_Accruals RM_Prod RM_DiscExp RM_Total 
         
Post-1991*I(Delaware) -0.007*** -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.049*** 
 
(-3.250) (-5.951) (-4.640) (-6.424) 
ROA 0.392*** -0.301*** 0.023 -0.214*** 
 
(4.014) (-4.548) (0.903) (-5.994) 
Log Assets -0.011*** 0.042*** -0.024*** 0.014* 
 
(-4.483) (7.400) (-3.067) (1.654) 
Log Firmage -0.015*** -0.041*** 0.040*** 0.011 
 
(-2.798) (-4.215) (2.720) (0.395) 
Leverage 0.013* 0.033*** -0.015 0.041* 
 
(1.948) (3.301) (-1.154) (1.911) 
Capx/Assets -0.004 -0.048* -0.300*** -0.378*** 
 
(-0.254) (-1.904) (-8.849) (-7.555) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.003* 0.004** -0.017*** -0.015*** 
 
(1.674) (2.036) (-5.449) (-3.145) 
Log Equity Volatility -0.000 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.107) (-2.952) (-0.189) (-0.393) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 
(-9.115) (-3.064) (-5.761) (-4.099) 
     
Observations 18,416 15,925 16,663 14,938 
R-squared 0.519 0.763 0.728 0.773 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 Earnings Manipulation and Proximity to Insolvency 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-
4999 and sic 6000-6999). The number of observations is reduced relative to those reported under Table 5 because of the availability of Merton’s Distance to 
Default measure. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All dependent variables are signed such that earnings management is increasing in more positive 
values. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of year and state of incorporation level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Abn_Accruals RM_Prod RM_DiscExp RM_Total 
          
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.001 -0.012*** -0.011* -0.027*** 
 
(0.445) (-2.817) (-1.830) (-2.855) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) -0.011* -0.024*** -0.029** -0.050*** 
 
(-1.750) (-2.714) (-2.135) (-3.516) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) 0.005 0.005 -0.012 -0.007 
 
(0.693) (0.543) (-0.883) (-0.550) 
ROA 0.421*** -0.261*** -0.008 -0.226*** 
 
(4.319) (-11.120) (-0.177) (-4.262) 
Log Assets -0.016*** 0.041*** -0.015 0.019 
 
(-4.641) (3.885) (-1.126) (1.620) 
Log Firmage -0.016* -0.037*** 0.036** 0.012 
 
(-1.906) (-3.034) (2.140) (0.340) 
Leverage 0.028*** 0.046*** -0.024 0.025 
 
(3.383) (5.192) (-1.122) (1.176) 
Capx/Assets -0.012 -0.061** -0.306*** -0.401*** 
 
(-0.630) (-2.268) (-6.467) (-7.714) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.001 0.000 -0.015*** -0.013** 
 
(0.661) (0.266) (-2.746) (-2.561) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 
 
(0.791) (-1.469) (-0.333) (0.264) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.010*** -0.003** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 
(-9.046) (-2.413) (-3.327) (-2.841) 
     
Observations 11,310 10,384 10,431 9,852 
R-squared 0.500 0.744 0.705 0.750 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0 
P-value 0.227 0.000 0.005 0.000 
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Table 7 Shareholder Clientele 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the 
interaction of year and state of incorporation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
% Total Inst % Ded Inst % Transi Inst 
       
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 1.375*** 1.290*** -0.655*** 
 
(4.850) (7.543) (-4.044) 
ROA 1.299 -1.716*** 4.007*** 
 
(1.133) (-2.805) (10.917) 
Log Assets 7.544*** 1.855*** 1.645*** 
 
(6.296) (8.013) (8.603) 
Log Firmage 5.705*** 1.698*** 0.943** 
 
(9.302) (2.994) (2.017) 
Leverage -6.525*** -0.995** -2.993*** 
 
(-7.503) (-2.543) (-10.176) 
Capx/Assets 4.322** -1.087 3.831*** 
 
(2.349) (-1.611) (5.422) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.379** -0.222** 0.526*** 
 
(2.316) (-2.012) (4.467) 
Log Equity Volatility -0.970*** -0.260 0.287*** 
 
(-3.277) (-1.565) (2.793) 
Log ROA Volatility -0.075 0.048 0.008 
 
(-0.749) (1.020) (0.192) 
    
Observations 12,117 12,117 12,117 
R-squared 0.907 0.698 0.685 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 Shareholder Clientele and Proximity to Insolvency 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-
4999 and sic 6000-6999). The number of observations is reduced relative to those reported under Table 7 because of the availability of Merton’s Distance to 
Default measure. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of year and state of 
incorporation level. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
% Total Inst % Ded Inst % Transi Inst 
       
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.928** 0.700*** -0.675*** 
 
(2.404) (3.296) (-3.032) 
Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency) 1.794** 3.425*** -0.751* 
 
(2.164) (6.899) (-1.707) 
Post-1991*I(Near-Insolvency) -0.265 -0.775* 0.368 
 
(-0.447) (-1.820) (1.368) 
ROA 0.762 -1.803* 4.390*** 
 
(0.371) (-1.860) (7.149) 
Log Assets 7.610*** 1.839*** 1.737*** 
 
(11.988) (7.326) (9.877) 
Log Firmage 5.503*** 1.004** 1.371** 
 
(7.469) (1.976) (2.256) 
Leverage -8.059*** -1.544*** -3.602*** 
 
(-6.070) (-3.113) (-10.758) 
Capx/Assets 5.902*** -1.623 4.424*** 
 
(2.687) (-1.544) (5.942) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.531*** -0.172 0.561*** 
 
(3.291) (-1.437) (4.406) 
Log Equity Volatility -1.319*** -0.325 0.283** 
 
(-3.759) (-1.645) (2.212) 
Log ROA Volatility 0.041 0.052 0.043 
 
(0.342) (0.742) (0.952) 
    
Observations 8,233 8,233 8,233 
R-squared 0.901 0.632 0.660 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
F test on Post-1991*I(Delaware)+Post-1991*I(Delaware)*I(Near-Insolvency)=0 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 9 Change in Firm Value and Default Risk 
The sample period is from 1988 to 1994 (excluding 1991 –  the year of the Credit Lyonnais court ruling). We 
exclude financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). Tobin’s Q and Distance to Defaultare 
measured at the end of each year from 1988 to 1990 (period before Delaware ruling) and between 1992 and 1994 
(period after Delaware ruling). All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of year and state of incorporation 
level. 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
Tobin's Q Distance to Default 
      
Post-1991*I(Delaware) 0.083*** 0.159*** 
 
(3.998) (3.351) 
ROA 0.882*** 0.602*** 
 
(11.440) (7.982) 
Log Assets -0.276*** -0.617*** 
 
(-4.478) (-11.811) 
Log Firmage -0.034 -0.296*** 
 
(-0.587) (-4.123) 
Leverage 0.004 -2.543*** 
 
(0.104) (-22.689) 
Capx/Assets 1.078*** -0.259 
 
(8.450) (-1.200) 
I(Issue Equity) 0.123*** 0.061** 
 
(11.135) (2.448) 
Log Equity Volatility 0.062*** -1.631*** 
 
(4.532) (-34.789) 
Log ROA Volatility 0.053*** -0.003 
 
(8.525) (-0.257) 
   
Observations 19,786 12,813 
R-squared 0.720 0.798 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
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